Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Sam Peebles :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell A. Cline; Crippen & Cline; Attorneys for Appellees.
Dennis K. Poole, John L. Adams; Poole, Sullivan & Adams; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Brookside v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2204

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
LTD.,a Utah Limited Partnership dba )
BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,

)

CASE NO. 990518
Plaintiff, Appellant, and CrossAppellee,
vs.
PRIORITY NO. 15
SAM PEEBLES aka SAMUEL B.
PEEBLES, an Individual; and HAROLD
BOYD PEEBLES, an Individual,
Defendants, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE HONORABLE J. C. FRATTO,
THIRD DISTRICT COURT ENTERED MAY 13,1999

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

DENNIS K. POOLE [2625]
JOHN L ADAMS [6160]
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone (801) 263-3344
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Russell A. Cline [4298]
CRIPPEN & CLINE L C .
310 South Main Street #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

FILED
Utah Court of AppMte

JUN 2 6 2000
Julia D'Alecandro
Clerk of th« Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
LTD.,a Utah Limited Partnership dba )
BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,

)

CASE NO. 990518
Plaintiff, Appellant, and CrossAppellee,
vs.
PRIORITY NO. 15
SAM PEEBLES aka SAMUEL B.
PEEBLES, an Individual; and HAROLD
BOYD PEEBLES, an Individual,
Defendants, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE HONORABLE J. C. FRATTO,
THIRD DISTRICT COURT ENTERED MAY 13,1999

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

DENNIS K. POOLE [2625]
JOHN L.ADAMS [6160]
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone (801) 263-3344
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Russell A. Cline [4298]
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C.
310 South Main Street #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

-iii-

ARGUMENT
-1I.A.1 Brookside's Lease With Richard Rowley, and the Peebles'
Consent Thereto. Constituted Surrender and Acceptance of any
Lease Between Brookside and Sam Peebles.
-1(a)
The Peebles Surrendered the Premises.
-1(b)
The Peebles Intended to Surrender the Premises.
-1(c)
Brookside Accepted the Peebles' Surrender of the Premises
-3I.A.2 Jury Verdict is Irrelevant for Purposes of Reviewing Granting of
Motion to Reconsider
-4I.A.3 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case for Unlawful Detainer . -5I.B.1 Brookside was a Bona Fide Purchaser
-8I.B.2 Brookside did not Assume the Sam Peebles Lease
-8I.B.3 The Bona Fide Purchaser Rule is not Preempted by the Mobile
Home Park Residency Act
-9I.B.4 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case Under the Unlawful Detainer
Act
-10I.B.5 Brookside's Claim of Unlawful Detainer is not Moot
-10(a)
The Section 57-16-8 "Safe Harbor" is Inapplicable to Evictions
Brought Under Unlawful Detainer
-12(b)
Treble Damages are Warranted in This Matter for Unlawful
Detainer
-12I.C(a)
Waiver and Estoppel is not a Basis for Granting the
Peebles' Motion to Reconsider
-13I.C(b)
Law of the Case Does not Apply to the Trial Court's
Granting of Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment
-13II.A The Unlawful Detainer Act Applies to Brookside's Eviction Action
Rather than the Mobile Home Park Residency Act
-14II.B Peebles Were Tenants at Will
-15II.C Proof of Service was Improperly Excluded from Evidence at Trial
-16II.D The Jury Found That no Written Lease Existed Between
Brookside and the Peebles.
-16II.E.1 Harold Peebles was Properly Served
-16-

II.E.2 Harold Peebles was Wrongly Dismissed by the Trial Court
-16III.
The Jury's Verdict Should be Upheld Regarding the Peebles'
Counterclaim of Unreasonableness Under the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act
-17IV. and V. Brookside Should be Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Costs
-20CONCLUSION

-21-

MAILING CERTIFICATE

-22-

E \JLA\BMHP\Pe«btes\repiybnef wpd

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1999)

-17-

Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465 (Utah 1999)
-7-, -8Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997)

-5-, -14-, -20-

Forrester v. Cook. 292 P. 206, 77 Utah 137 (1930)

-11-

Latses v. Nick Floor. Inc.. 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (Utah 1940)
Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1999)
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989)
Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322 (Ut. App. 1993)

-8-17-2-17-

Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988)
-14State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

-5-

STATUTES
57-16- 4(1) Utah Code Annotated

-9-

57-16- 4(2) Utah Code Annotated

-10-

57-16- 8 Utah Code Annotated

-12-

57-16- 9 Utah Code Annotated

-3-, -6-, -13-, -16-

57-16-15.1 Utah Code Annotated
78-36- 3 Utah Code Annotated
78-36- 6(2) Utah Code Annotated
78-36-10 Utah Code Annotated

-15-6-, -7-, -11-6-, -7-11-, -12-

OTHER AUTHORITIES
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 252 (1995)

E ULA\BMHP\PaetM«s\replybnef wpd

-iv-

-4-

ARGUMENT
The arguments in this Reply Brief are limited to the new matters raised by
Defendants Samuel B. Peebles ("Sam Peebles") and Harold Peebles (together the
"Peebles") in their Brief. The arguments herein are numbered in response to the
appropriate sections of the Peebles' Brief to aid the Court in reviewing the issues
raised.
I.A.1 Brookside's Lease With Richard Rowley, and the Peebles'
Consent Thereto. Constituted Surrender and Acceptance of any
Lease Between Brookside and Sam Peebles.
(a)

The Peebles Surrendered the Premises.

In their brief the Peebles argue that because their mobile home remained on
space #100, they did not surrender space #100 to Brookside. (Brief of Appellees
at page 20.) This bald, conclusory assertion is not consistent with the facts that the
Peebles sold the mobile home to several different individuals. (Deposition of Sam
Peebles at 13, 16, and 20.) At the time of Brookside's purchase of the park, the
Peebles had rented the mobile home to Richard Rowley with an option to purchase
and knew that Mr. Rowley entered into a lease for space #100 directly with
Brookside. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 20-22; T. 183-84.) Such actions by Sam
Peebles constitute a surrender of space #100 because tenancies superior to that
of Sam Peebles existed regarding both the mobile home and space #100.
(b)

The Peebles Intended to Surrender the Premises.

In their brief the Peebles argue that they had no intent to surrender space
#100 to Brookside. (Brief of Appellees at pages 20-22.) As noted above, the

-1-

Peebles' actions in selling their mobile home to various individuals, in renting their
mobile home to Richard Rowley with an option to purchase, and consenting to Mr.
Rowley and the other purchasers to enter into direct leases with Brookside for space
#100 objectively demonstrate the Peebles' intent to surrender space #100.
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 13-22; T. 183-184.) The Peebles' arguments that
they did not intend to surrender space #100 highlight the policy reasons for
disallowing a party to contradict deposition testimony with self-serving affidavits in
order to create an issue of fact.
Whether the Peebles realized the full legal ramifications of surrendering
space #100 is irrelevant as to whether the Peebles surrendered space #100.
Though it may have been practice for Brookside's predecessor to enter into two
leases for the same space, such a practice is irrelevant regarding Brookside given
that it did not engage in such a practice. (R. at 771.) A subsequent lease would
replace the initial lease under the doctrine of surrender as a matter of law. Reid v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).
The Peebles' actions in selling the mobile home, renting it to Richard Rowley
with an option to purchase, consenting to Mr. Rowley and other purchasers to enter
into direct leases with Brookside for space #100, and Sam Peebles' refusal to enter
into leases with Brookside objectively demonstrate their intent to surrender space
#100 and bald statements to the contrary are not sufficient to counter such a
conclusion. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 20-22; T. 183-184.)
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(c)

Brookside Accepted the Peebles' Surrender of the Premises

In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside did not accept the Peebles'
surrender of space #100. (Brief of Appellees at pages 22-24.) However, Brookside
accepted the Peebles's surrender of space #100 when it entered into a new lease
with Richard Rowley.

(R. at 414-15.)

Brookside looked to the Peebles as

lienholders for payment of rent when Mr. Rowley defaulted on his lease with
Brookside because the Peebles' mobile home remained on the property. (R. at
415.)
Pursuant to the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, the Peebles became
lienholders regarding the trailer located on space #100 rather than residents. Utah
Code Annotated § 57-16-9. "[T]he lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent." i d The Peebles had to
either remove the mobile home or commence paying rent for space #100. (R. at
415.) Brookside did not seek payment of rent from Sam Peebles under a previous
lease with Brookside. (R. at 415-16.) Brookside's notices to the Peebles indicated
that Brookside considered the mobile home abandoned and Peebles lienholders
that "are primarily liable to the Brookside Mobile Home Park for all rent." (R. at 432.)
The right to tenancy of Mr. Rowley in space #100 was inconsistent with the Peebles
having a right to tenancy and Brookside's execution of the Rowley lease was an
acceptance of Sam Peebles' surrender of space #100.
In their brief, the Peebles claim that Brookside miscited 49 Am. Jur. 2d
Landlord and Tenant Section 252 (1995) for the proposition that Sam Peebles'
-3-

assent to the Rowley lease is sufficient to create a surrender and acceptance of
space #100. The Peebles included an initial line to the quote used by Brookside to
support their interpretation of the passage that such an assent is only a surrender
upon the execution of a lease between the same tenant and landlord. However, the
line following the original quote used by Brookside further clarifies the statement and
demonstrates that the quote fully supports Brookside's proposition. The original
quote along with both the previous and following lines reads as follows:
There is a presumption that acceptance by the tenant of a new lease
of the premises during the term of an old lease operates as a surrender
of the old lease by the act of the parties; that is a surrender of a lease
is implied by law when another estate is created by the reversioner or
remainderman, with the assent of the tenant, that is incompatible with
the existing term. Thus, as a general rule, when a new lease of the
premises is taken by the lessee from the lessor for the whole or a part
of the term embraced in the former one, there is said to be a surrender
in law because the giving of a new lease necessarily implies a
surrender of the old one. It is not necessary that the second lease be
given to the first lessee: if it is given to a third person with the consent
of the first lessee, accompanied with the possession, it is equally
operative as a surrender.
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 252 (1995) (emphasis added).
I.A.2 Jury Verdict is Irrelevant for Purposes of Reviewing Granting of
Motion to Reconsider
In their brief, the Peebles argue that Sam Peebles's Affidavit does not conflict
with his prior sworn statement and that such argument was validated by the jury
verdict that Sam Peebles' had not surrendered his lease. (Brief of Appellees at
page 24.) The jury verdict regarding Sam Peebles' surrender of his lease is
irrelevant because Brookside's appeal concerns the trial court's granting of the
Peebles Motion for Reconsideration overturning its previous grant of summary
-4-

judgment to Brookside. The issue of whether Sam Peebles surrendered his lease
is a mixed fact and legal question in which this court must determine whether the
"given set of facts come within the reach of a given rule of law." State v. Pena. 869
P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994). In reviewing the summary judgment portion of this
action, this court may "determine the legal effect of specific facts." \± at 937.
I.A.3 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case for Unlawful Detainer
In their brief, the Peebles raise the argument that Brookside failed to make
a prima facie case of Unlawful Detainer at the summary judgment stage of this
action without providing any detail and blending the argument with issues occurring
at the trial stage of the proceedings. (Brief of Appellees at 25 and 33-39.)
The Peebles have failed to preserve this issue for review on appeal. "When
there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court reached or ruled on
an issue, this court will not undertake to consider the issue on appeal." Estate of
Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015,1018 (Utah App. 1997). The Peebles failed to raise this
issue at the summary judgment or trial phase of the proceedings and therefore
have not preserved this issue and it cannot be heard at this time. In order to
reserve an issue on appeal, the trial court must have an "opportunity to consider"
the arguments raised on appeal. JcL The Peebles failed to raise this issue at the
motion summary judgment phase of this matter and it is therefore barred on appeal.
Even if the Peebles have preserved the issue of proper service under
Unlawful Detainer, the record at the summary judgment phase indicates that
Brookside complied with the requirements of the Utah Code regarding unlawful
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detainer. Pursuant to the Unlawful Detainer Act, a tenant of real property is guilty
of unlawful detainer "when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other period rent reserved . . . [ , ] in case of tenancies at will, where he
remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice not less than
five days." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(b). If a person of suitable age or discretion
cannot be found at the place of residence, then notice may be served "by affixing
a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-366(2)(b).
The Peebles liability for rent to Brookside arose from the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act which states "the lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent." Utah Code Ann. § 57-169. Because the Peebles' liability is created by statute, such a tenancy should be
deemed a tenancy at will, rather than a month to month tenancy, because there was
no agreement between the parties, either verbal or written, creating the tenancy.
After service on the Peebles of notice of their duty to pay rent as lienholders, the
Peebles made sporadic payments and were in default at the time Brookside served
notice of unlawful detainer. (R. at 415-418.) The Peebles sporadic payment of rent
was in compliance with a statutory mandate and should not be deemed to create
a tenancy beyond a tenancy at will.
Brookside served the Peebles with a five-day notice by posting the same on
the trailer pursuant to the affidavit of service executed by Constable William L. Mciff.
(R. at 65-66.) The Peebles themselves indicate that the mobile home was vacant
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at the time of the posting. (Appellees' Brief at page 37.) Such service by posting
was therefore proper because there would not have been "a person of suitable are
or discretion" at the mobile home with whom to leave a copy. Utah Code Ann. § 7836-3.
The Peebles argue that Brookside should have attempted to serve the
Peebles at their places of residence and, if no person of suitable age or discretion
was available, then posting at the mobile home. Given the intent of the statute and
wording of the entire statute, it is clear that "the place of residence" to be served is
the same location as "the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-6(2). It should
also be noted that Constable Mciff also indicated in his affidavit that he mailed
copies of the notices to the Peebles at the addresses "12067 South 2240 West
Riverton, Utah 84065, and also 12668 So, 2360 West Riverston 84065." (R. at 66.)
At trial, the trial court did not allow the admission of the affidavit of service
because Constable Mciff was deceased before this matter went to trial and was
therefore unavailable for cross examination. (T. at 138.) However, under Utah law
a "constable's Affidavit of Service is prima facie evidence of proper service of
process and is deemed presumptively correct."

Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All

American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1999). The burden shifts to the
party opposing the affidavit to show the "invalidity or absence of service of process
. . . by clear and convincing evidence." id.- (citations omitted) Because the trial
court erroneously refused to admit into evidence the affidavit of service of process,
the record at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings was different than the
-7-

record at trial. Such ruling by the trial court was incorrect pursuant to Classic
Cabinet, and reversible by this Court.
I.B.1 Brookside was a Bona Fide Purchaser
In their brief, the Peebles argue that due to their mobile home being located
on space #100 at the time of Brookside's purchase of the park, Brookside had
constructive notice of Sam Peebles interest in space #100. (Brief of Appellees at
page 26.) However, on the rent roll attached to the Purchase Agreement, Richard
Rowley was noted as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.) Given that a lease with
Rowley did exist, Brookside did not have constructive notice that the mobile home
was owned by the Peebles. (R. 302.) The Peebles also cite Latses v. Nick Floor.
Inc.. 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (Utah 1940) for the proposition that a grantee's
position is no stronger than the grantor's. In Latses. the grantee did not meet its
burden to investigate the tenants of the premises and the terms of such contractual
relations, i d at 622. In this matter, Brookside has met its duty to inquire, by
obtaining a rent roll which lists Rowley as the lessee of space #100, reviewing the
terms of the actual lease the park had with Rowley, and confirming that Rowley
occupied space #100. (R. at 409, 414-15.)
I.B.2 Brookside did not Assume the Sam Peebles Lease
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside assumed all leases and
agreements appurtenant to the Park when it purchased the Park pursuant to the
terms of the Assignment. (Brief of Appellees at page 26.) The Peebles thus argue
that Brookside therefore assumed the Sam Peebles lease though it is not listed on
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the rent roll attachment to the Assignment. (Brief of Appellees at 26.) In making
this argument, Peebles have mischaracterized the language of the Assignment by
quoting only a portion of it out of context. The language of the Assignment limits
the leases being assumed to those listed on the rent roll. The relevant language of
the Assignment states that Brookside was assigned:
right, title, and interest in and to those certain leases, rental
agreements, security or other deposits from tenants, and rentals with
respect to such leases and agreements appurtenant to the Property,
except as provided herein (hereinafter collectively referred to the
'Leases'), which Leases, rents, and security deposits are more
particularly described on Exhibit 'B' attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference.
(R. 293.) The rent roll limits the leases being assumed by Brookside which listed
only "Rowley" as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.)
I.B.3 The Bona Fide Purchaser Rule is not Preempted by the Mobile
Home Park Residency Act
In their brief, the Peebles argue that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act
preempts the bona fide purchaser rule. (Brief of Appellees at pages 27-28.) In
support of this argument, the Peebles cite Section 57-16-4(1) of the Mobile Home
Park Residency Act which states that "a mobile home park or its agents may not
terminate a lease or rental agreement upon any grounds other than as specified in
this chapter." This provision however, does not address how a purchaser is to be
placed on notice of silent leases and what effect, if any, they would have on a bona
fide purchaser. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-2 and 57-3-3 suggests that without actual
or constructive notice, the lease is void as to Brookside. As found by the trial court
in granting Brookside's motion for summary judgment, and later held by the jury,

there was no written lease between Brookside and Sam Peebles.

The Act

specifically requires that "[e]ach agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall
be written and signed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(2). There was no "lease or
rental agreement" being terminated by Brookside, the Peebles had the role of a
lender or lienholder, the Act does not apply, and Brookside was compelled to pursue
an unlawful detainer action against the Peebles.
Furthermore, in order for the Peebles to receive the benefits of the Mobile
Home Park Residency Act they must meet the requirements of the Act. Sam
Peebles refused to sign a written lease with Brookside, as required by the Act.
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 36-37.) Because the Peebles did not comply with
the Act by refusing to sign a written lease they have chosen to not obtain the
benefits provided by the Act.
I.B.4 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case Under the Unlawful Detainer
Act
Please see Brookside's arguments presented in Section I.A.3 beginning on
page 5 of this brief.
I.B.5 Brookside's Claim of Unlawful Detainer is not Moot
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer is
moot because the Peebles vacated space #100 and paid Brookside all unpaid rent
while this action was pending. (Brief of Appellees at page 29.) However, the
Peebles paid the rent to Brookside under a stipulation made in open court on
December 4, 1996, that "Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the rights of the
-10-

parties." (Letter from Brooksides' counsel to Peebles' counsel dated December 4,
1996 a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Also
attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" are true and correct copies of letters dated
January 8, 1997, and May 29, 1997, further confirming the stipulation.) Pursuant
to the terms of the stipulation, Brookside cannot be prejudiced in this action by the
Peebles' payment of rent.
Even if the stipulation had not been entered into, payment of back rent after
the commencement of an unlawful detainer and vacation are not sufficient to render
a cause of action for unlawful detainer moot. Unlawful detainer commences upon
service of notice of the same. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3. The property owner
recovers damages for its lack of access to the property during the unlawful detainer
period which is then trebled.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.

Contrary to the

arguments of the Peebles, "rent" is not the recovery provided by unlawful detainer.
The plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action "is entitled to recover such damages as
are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer." Forrester v.
Cook. 292 P. 206,214, 77 Utah 137 (1930). "While damages may not be restricted
to the rental value and may include more, yet the rental value during the unlawful
withholding of possession is the minimum of damages." JcL "After the tenancy has
been terminated by the notice required by the statute, the person in unlawful
possession is not owing rent under the contract, but must respond in damages
pursuant to the law." ]a\ The Peebles tender of rent is not satisfaction of unlawful
detainer, their continued possession of space #100 is the basis of the action. To

allow a party to vacate premises days before a trial regarding unlawful detainer and
render the matter moot, as happened in this case, would defeat the purposes of
unlawful detainer.

The payment of back rent should be applied against the

judgment amount due Brookside after calculation and trebling of Brookside's
damages pursuant to Utah statute.
(a)

The Section 57-16-8 "Safe Harbor" is Inapplicable to Evictions
Brought Under Unlawful Detainer

The Peebles cite Section 57-16-8 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as
creating a safe harbor from imposition of treble damages for Unlawful Detainer.
(Brief of Appellees at pages 29-30.) Section 57-16-8 of the Act does not refer to
Unlawful Detainer and is therefore limited to evictions brought under the Mobile
Home Park Residency Act. Also, the Peebles refused to sign a written lease, as
required by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and therefore should be denied
the benefits of the Act. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 36-37.)
(b)

Treble Damages are Warranted in This Matter for Unlawful
Detainer

In their brief the Peebles argue that because they have vacated space #100
and paid rents due while this action was pending, Brookside has not suffered
damages under Section 78-36-10 of Utah Code Annotated regarding Unlawful
Detainer and therefore there are no damages to be trebled for unlawful detainer.
(Brief of Appellees at pages 30-31.) Even though the Peebles vacated the lot and
paid rents due during the pendency of this matter, as argued above in section I.B.5
commencing on page 10, Brookside has suffered damages caused by the Peebles

E \JLA\BMHP\Peebles\replybnef wpd

-12-

failure to vacate the premises. Such damages do not disappear upon payment of
past rent. Rents paid by the Peebles should offset the damages suffered by
Brookside once they have been determined by the court. This Court should remand
this matter for determination of the amount of damages suffered by Brookside due
to the Peebles unlawful detainer which would be trebled pursuant to Unlawful
Detainer.
I.C(a)

Waiver and Estoppel is not a Basis for Granting the
Peebles' Motion to Reconsider

In their brief the Peebles argue that an independent basis to uphold the trial
court's grant of their Motion to Reconsider is waiver and estoppel due to Brookside's
acceptance of rental payments. (Brief of Appellees at page 32.) However, the
Peebles payment of rent was as a lienholder of the mobile home who has a primary
obligation for payment of rent to Brookside. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-9.
Also, Brookside gave notice to the Peebles to vacate the premises as
lienholder of the trailer. (R. at 432.) Any payment of rent was as a lienholder as
provided under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
I.C(b)

Law of the Case Does not Apply to the Trial Court's
Granting of Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment

In their brief the Peebles argue that the trial court was barred under the
doctrine of the law of the case from granting Brookside's Motion for Summary
Judgment when an earlier Motion for Summary Judgment by Brookside had been
denied. (Brief of Appellees at page 32.) The Peebles have first brought this

_

o

_(_

.13_

argument on appeal. It has therefore not been preserved below and is barred.
Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997).
As noted in the case cited by the Peebles in their brief, "any judge is free to
change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally
rendered." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42,45 (Utah
App. 1988) (citations omitted). Although a trial court is not bound by its own
precedents, "prior relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be
followed." \± (citations omitted). The "law of the case" doctrine is most applicable
regarding motions for summary judgment when "a subsequent motion fails to
present the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is
introduced." lg\ (citations omitted).
In this matter, significant discovery had occurred after Brookside's initial
motion for summary judgment. Brookside introduced new material evidence in the
form of deposition testimony which supported its second motion for summary
judgment and persuaded the court to grant the same. If applicable in this matter,
the "law of the case" doctrine would bar the Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration,
a motion not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and involving
repetitious contentions of the issues of this case.
II.A

The Unlawful Detainer Act Applies to Brookside's
Eviction Action Rather than the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act

In their brief the Peebles argue that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act
applies to Brookside's eviction proceeding because Sam Peebles was a resident
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of the Park without addressing the fact that Sam Peebles did not reside in the Park
and there was no written lease between the Peebles and Brookside as required by
the Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 34-35.) Under the Peebles' interpretation of
the Act, a mobile home park owner would never be able to pursue an action of
unlawful detainer if the party in unlawful detainer (lienholder or holding a status
other than a Resident) had at some point in time made a rent payment with or
without a written lease though the Act requires such leases to be in writing.
In addition, the plain language of the Act allows a park owner to elect to
pursue an eviction proceeding solely under the Act or to simultaneously pursue a
claim for unlawful detainer. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-15.1. Section 57-16-15.1 of
the Mobile Home Park Residency Act sets forth the procedural and remedy
differences between proceedings "where a landlord elects to bring an action under
this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer provisions" and proceedings "in
which the mobile home park has elected to treat as actions also brought under the
unlawful detainer provisions." (emphasis added). Section 57-16-15.1 allows for
election of unlawful detainer remedies where behavior by a resident endangers the
security of other residents and for nonpayment of rent.
II.B

Peebles Were Tenants at Will

Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3
hereinabove commencing on page 5.
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II.C

Proof of Service was Improperly Excluded from Evidence at Trial

Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3
hereinabove commencing on page 5.
II.D

The Jury Found That no Written Lease Existed Between
Brookside and the Peebles.

In their brief the Peebles misrepresent the holdings of the jury claiming that
because the jury found that Sam Peebles had a written lease with Brookside's
predecessor and Sam Peebles had not surrendered the same, Brookside had to
comply with the Mobile Home Park Residency Act in terminating such written lease.
(Brief of Appellees at page 38.) However, the jury Interrogatory following those
cited by the Peebles, indicates that the jury specifically found that Brookside had not
assumed the Sam Peebles written lease. (R. 920.) The jury therefore found that
no written lease existed between Brookside and the Peebles and the Peebles'
arguments to the contrary are a misrepresentation to this Court.
II.E.1 Harold Peebles was Properly Served
Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3
hereinabove commencing on page 5.
II.E.2 Harold Peebles was Wrongly Dismissed by the Trial Court
In their brief the Peebles claim that Brookside did not dispute in its brief
Harold Peebles dismissal by the trial court.

(Brief of Appellees at page 39.)

However, Brookside briefed this issue on page 22 of its initial brief. Please also
note that pursuant to Section 57-16-9 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act,
Harold Peebles' liability arises from his status as a lienholder regarding the trailer.
E:\JLA\BMHP\Peebles\replybnefwpd
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Despite the trial court's ruling to the contrary, Harold Peebles' liability arose from his
ownership of the trailer and his refusal to vacate the premises despite demands
from Brookside.
III.

The Jury's Verdict Should be Upheld Regarding the Peebles'
Counterclaim of Unreasonableness Under the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act

In their brief the Peebles argue that the jury verdict that Brookside's rejection
of Ms. Southworth's application was reasonable under the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act was in error and should be overturned by this Court. In reviewing
such a challenge, this Court reviews the sufficiency of all evidence "in the light most
favorable to the verdict." Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1999) (citations
omitted). "So long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's
findings," the appellate court will not disturb them. Ja\ The verdict will only be
reversed if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."
\± In order to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of the
evidence, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the
findings."

Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993).

In

marshaling the evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon
v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). If the challenging party fails to
properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court must affirm the findings below.
Robb at 1328.
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The Peebles in this matter have failed to marshal the evidence supporting the
jury verdict. (Brief of Appellees at pages 39-46.) Instead, they merely reargue the
same case made before the trial court presenting selected facts and excerpts of trial
testimony in support of their position. The Peebles cite only two pages of the trial
transcript regarding evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then do not present
such testimony verbatim, as they do with testimony supporting their position, but
summarize it in a way to give the impression such testimony supports their
arguments. (Brief of Appellees at 43.)
A cursory review of the trial transcript demonstrates evidence in support of the
jury verdict that was not marshaled by the Peebles.

In the testimony of Ms.

Southworth, she acknowledged that her credit report from Western Reporting states
that Western Reporting was unable to verify her employment though the
employment was at a company she owned.

(T. 306-07.)

In so doing, Ms.

Southworth testified as follows:
Q.

And if you look down at the employment section on page two of that,
see the employment there? It says that you're employed at Utah
Academy?

A.

Professional Dental Assistance, yes, I am.

Q.

It doesn't say that, does it? It just says employed Utah Academy.

A.

That's what the Western is, or Western Reporting put down, as far as
the income.

Q.

You've answered my question.

A.

Sorry.

Q.

Let me ask you the next question.
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A.

Yes.

Q.

There's also a comment there that says unable to verify. Do you see
that? Do you see that?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Did you ever get a call from Western Reporting seeking to verify how
you were employed or whether it was self employment?

A.

No, I did not, not that I received myself. One of my staff members may
have.

(T. 306-07.)
Ms. Southworth also acknowledged that her credit report from Western
Reporting indicate that Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at Utah
First Credit. (T. 307-308.) In so doing, Ms. Southworth testified as follows:
Q.

Okay. Look up at the language above that where it says bank
summary.

A.

Financial?

Q.

Un-huh. Bank — well, just above it says bank summary?

A.

Okay.

Q.

You see that whole box right there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

It says bank, Utah First Credit, you see that language?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And it says later, down, comment: Would not verify information over
phone. Do you see that?

A.

Right.

Q.

Did anyone ever tell you that the credit bureau was unable to verify
information at Utah First Credit?

A.

I would not allow any of my banks, or personal to verify anything to
anyone without okay from me.

(T. 307-08.)
In addition, though Ms. Southworth claims to have approached Mr. Prentice
with her tax returns and financial information regarding her application to Brookside,
Mr. Prentice testified that he did not see that she had tax returns or other financial
information with her when Ms. Southworth came to the Brookside office. (T. 616.)
The Peebles did not tender Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut
Brookside's basis for denying her application and so the issues has not been
preserved on appeal. Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997).
Because the Peebles have failed to properly marshal the evidence, the jury's
findings should be affirmed.

Furthermore, the evidence noted above of Ms.

Southworth's credit report indicating that the credit agency was unable to verify her
employment or bank account is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that
Brookside's rejection of her application as a tenant to be reasonable. The Peebles
did not tender Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence and have therefore not
preserved on appeal the issues of whether her credit was sufficient.
IV. and V.

Brookside Should be Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Costs

In their brief the Peebles first argue in section IV of their brief that Brookside
is not entitled to recovery of attorney's fees in defending against the Peebles
counterclaim under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act because Brookside's
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eviction proceeded under the Unlawful Detainer Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages
46-50.) The Peebles then argue the opposite in section V of their brief that even
though Brookside proceeded to evict the Peebles under the Unlawful Detainer Act,
dismissal of such claim by the trial court results in recovery of their attorney's fees
under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 51 -52.)

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Brookside respectfully requests that this Court
reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, determine Brookside has
prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for unlawful detainer, remand
this matter to the trial court for calculation of appropriate treble damages under the
applicable statute, and award Brookside Attorneys' fees and costs due under the
Mobile Home Park Residency Act due to Brookside prevailing against the Peebles
regarding the Peebles' claims under the Act.
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of June, 2000:
\
'y?n-io*-

/<77Z

DENNIS K. POOLE
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C.
Attorneys for Appellants

-21-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
following t h i s ^ d a y of June, 2000:
Russell A. Cline
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Telephone (801) 539-1900
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Tab A

DENNIS K POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C.
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY

4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE (801) 263-33-44
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010

December 4, 1996

Mr. Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Sam Peebles

Dear Mr. Cline:
This letter will confirm the stipulation made in Court this
date that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the
rights of the parties.
I am enclosing herewith for your reference copies of the
checks which we have been holding and which we are forwarding to
Brookside to deposit. You should be aware that as of December 1,
1996 a total of $2,115.00 is due and owing for rent.
After
applying the checks we are holding, which total $1,370.00, there is
a balance of $745.00. Unless we receive this amount in full within
the next ten (10) days, we will file a Motion for Summary Judgment
based upon the failure to pay the lot rental.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter

DENNIS K. POOLE
DKP:ec
Enc.
cc:
Brookside Mobile Home Park, w/checks

ciln.J.LT*

(dkp)

TabB

DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C.
ANDREA NUFFER

4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010

January 8, 1997

VIA TELEFAX - 322-1054
AND REGULAR MAIL
Russell A. Cline, Esq.
Crippen & Cline, L.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:
Vs:

Brookside Mobile Home Park
Sam Peebles, et al

Dear Mr. Cline:
We have been advised by our client that Mr. Peebles has left
in their office a check in the amount of $1,000.00 to cover the
past due rent as well as the monthly rental payment for January
1997. This letter will confirm that we are advising our client to
negotiate this check and any future payments made by Mr. Peebles
pending the outcome of this litigation, should we choose to accept
them, based upon the stipulation made in Court on December 4, 1996,
to the effect that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the
checks tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice
to the rights of the parties.
I am enclosing herewith for your reference a copy of the
check. We will advise our client to hold the check until January
13, 1997, before depositing the same in the event you are not
agreeable to this procedure.
Should you have any questions or objections regarding
acceptance of this check, please advise before January 13th.
truly yo

DENNIS K. POOLE
DKP:ec
Enc.
c c : B r o o k s i d e Mobile Home Park

TabC

DENNIS K . POOLE & ASSOCIATES,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

P.C.

DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C.
ANDREA NUFFER

4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010

May 29, 1997

VIA TELEFAX - 322-1054
Russell A. Cline, Esq.
Crippen & Cline, L.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:
Vs:

Brookside Mobile Home Park
Sam Peebles, et al

Dear Mr. Cline;
We have been advised by our client that Mr. Peebles has left
a message on the answering machine in their office requesting the
amount owing for rental payments now due inasmuch as he is desirous
of bringing the payments current. Will you please advise Mr.
Peebles that the following amounts are now due:
March 1997
April 1997
May 1997
June 199 7
Total

$
265.00
$
285.00
$
285.00
$
255.00
$ 1,090.00

The payments for March, April and May include a $30.00 late charge.
If the payment is made after June 5th, there will be an additional
late charge due on the June payment.
This letter will confirm that any payments made by Mr. Peebles
pending the outcome of this litigation, are based upon the stipulation made in Court on December 4, 1996, to the effect that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks tendered by Mr.
Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the rights of the
parties.
Should you have any questions, please advise.
:y truly yours,
/

DENNIS K. POOLE
DKP:ec
Enc.
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park

